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default judgment on the listed debt. The bankrupt petitioned
that court under the cancellation statute and the judgment was
cancelled. As to the third possibility, although no case law has
been found, it would seem that if the bankrupt has appeared in a
subsequent state action, the doctrine of res judicata would prevent
him from utilizing the statute.
Conclusion
Varied solutions to the problem of what constitutes an "unusual
circumstance" have been advanced. For some, proposed legislation
provides the answer. Others believe 'that the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari to the proper case in an effort to redefine
the test with more precision. Yet, it should be borne in mind
that the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, requires a certain
flexibility, lest the equitable remedy become frozen. The present
test seems to provide that degree of elasticity necessary for a court
of equity to grant relief when the remedy at law is inadequate
and, perhaps, should not be so readily abandoned. Most of the
problems that arise in this area could be averted if the attorney
who represents the bankrupt in the bankruptcy proceeding would
advise him as to the effect of his discharge.
X
THE CHANGING APPROACH TO "TRIAL By NEwsPAPER"
One of the basic rights guaranteed by our Constitution is
that one accused of a crime be afforded a fair trial by an impartial
jury. This guarantee is made applicable to state prosecutions by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' An essential
ingredient of that right is that an accused be tried by jurors whose
verdict is based solely upon a consideration of competent evidence
received in open court.2 However, as the incidence of crime
reporting has increased,3 it has become difficult to empanel jurors
who have not read something of the case. Often, the publicity
to which they have been exposed will be extremely prejudicial.4
I In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266-73 (1948).
2 People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 380, 111 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1916).
3 In discussing the amount lof publicity attendant to a particular trial
one writer commented that there Were "Words enough, if put into book form,
to make a shelf of novels 22 feet long." BARNES & TErrERs, NEW HoRIzoNs
IN CRIMINOLOGY, 192, 193 (2d ed. 1951).
4 For a discussion of the type of publicity that precedes a sensational
trial see SULLrvA, TRIAL By NEWSPAPER (1961); Issacs, The Crime of
Present Day Crime Reporting, 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 405 (1961).
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The newspapers may have published information which would
got be admitted into evidence. Or they may have described the
accused in one of the familiar stereotypes, and revealed his past
criminal record in detail. If a trial has sensational news value,
the papers may be extremely partisan. These efforts, which often
jeopardize an accused's right to an impartial trial, have been
termed "trial by newspaper," and have been condemned as the
"legitimate great-grandchild of ordeal by fire, water and battle." ,
This note will examine the extent to which the courts have reversed
convictions, where prejudicial publicity has been brought to the
attention of jurors either before or after empanelment. This dis-
cussion will examine the power of state and federal courts to
reverse convictions when a defendant claims that the prejudicial
publicity resulted in a denial of a fair trial in violation of due
process. It will also analyze the power of the federal courts to
reverse federal convictions by virtue of their supervisory power.
Newspaper Prejudice
Studies have revealed that publicity is capable of producing
opinions and attitudes. 6 It would seem that these opinions may
be formed in two ways. Either the publicity may directly in-
fluence the mind of a juror through his reading of the article
or it may exert indirect influence through the formation of a com-
munity attitude.7 In the latter case, despite the fact that it is
indirect, an impartial trial may be impossible in an atmosphere
of intense community hostility.8
The psychological advantages and the lack of judicial control
that newspaper publicity enjoys over evidence introduced in the
courtroom support the conclusion that newspaper-produced prejudice
may be common in the minds of the jurors. Psychologically,
publicity is most effective when it appeals to emotions.0 Since
newspaper publicity via misleading headlines and stereotypes has
an emotional appeal, it is capable of exerting greater influence
than the more rational material presented in the courtroom. In
addition, publicity will be most persuasive when it does not en-
counter any opposition, that is, when it does not have to compete
with opinions already formed through past knowledge.' 0 Since
5 Boldt, Should Canon 35 Be Amended?, 41 A.B.A.J. 55 (1955).
6 REPORT OF T E CRimE CoMMISSION OF THE: STATE OF Nav YORK,
307, 319-20 (1927).
7 WRIGHT, MASS COMMUNICATION: k SocoWGicA PERsPCTIVE 49-73(1959).
8 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
9 MuRPry & NEwcomD, ExPRIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 961, 977-79
(rev. ed. 1937).
1od. at 962; see Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials And The
Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 837 (1961).
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press coverage is usually confined to the commission of a crime
and the apprehension of an accused, these accounts will be more
effective, in that they represent the jurors' first exposure to
the facts of the case, and will not have to replace any pre-
conceived opinions.
From a legal viewpoint, newspaper reports, unlike evidence
presented in a courtroom, are subject to neither the scrutiny
of the trial judge, nor intensive cross-examination. Secondly,
newspaper articles may contain facts, such as the prior criminal
record of an accused or results of lie detector tests, which would
be inadmissible in a courtroom. Facts introduced by these
means are as damaging as if they had been actually admitted into
evidence.
The Standard of Impartiality
At early American common law a juror was disqualified from
service if he had formulated an opinion as to the guilt or in-
nocence of an accused." Soon however, as the mass publications
expanded their circulation, this view was considered inadequate
because, when a case was heavily publicized, it might have pre-
vented the empaneling of a jury.' 2  The criterion adopted was
that a juror need not be dismissed if he had a preconceived opinion
concerning the guilt or innocence of an accused; provided, however,
that he could state to the court's satisfaction that he would lay
aside this opinion, and render a fair and impartial verdict based
solely on the evidence presented at the trial."
This affirmation by a juror, and its acceptance by a trial judge,
did not preclude an appellate court from considering whether
the defendant bad actually been denied due process. Thus, on
appeal a conviction could be reversed if an accused showed "the
actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of a juror as will
raise the presumption of partiality." 1 The question left un-
answered was what facts would be sufficient to establish this
presumption of partiality.
11Greenfield v. People, 74 N.Y. 277 (1878) (per curiam); People v.
Allen, 43 N.Y. 28, 34 (1870); People v. Miller, 125 Cal. 44, 57 Pac. 770
(1899).
12Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).
13 Spies v. Illinois, 299 U.S. 131, 168-69 (1887); Reynolds v. United
States, supra note 12. Many states have incorporated this standard into
statutory form; see, e.g., N.Y. CODE Crm. PROC. § 376(2); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1076.
14 Reynolds v. United States, supra note 12, at 157.
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Due Process and the Impartial Jury Cases Prior to Irvin v. Dowd
The presence of extensive and prejudicial publicity in and of
itself was insufficient to establish that an accused had been denied
a fair trial.15 Nor could a conviction be reversed merely because
some of the jurors had read the articles prior to trial.16 If the
prejudicial material was read by the jurors while a trial was
progressing, the instructions of a trial judge to disregard any opinion
formed by the article was considered sufficient to insure the right
of an accused to an impartial trial. 17 This view met with some
disagreement.' 8 Finally, if the reading of the publicity by the
jurors during trial was known to a defendant, and he did not
make a prompt objection, he was deemed to have waived his right
to reversal on that ground.19 The courts granted a trial judge
wide discretion on the issue of a juror's partiality, and his
decision would be set aside only when clearly in error.20
In Stroble v. California,21 the accused prior to trial was
described as a "sex mad killer" and a "werewolf." The newspapers
printed his confession along with the district attorney's statements
that he was guilty, and that sex offenders should be treated in the
same manner as mad dogs. The Court rejected Stroble's claim
that he had been denied a fair trial and commented that he had
failed "to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced." 22
Many factors have been considered by appellate courts in their
determination of whether a defendant had been denied a fair trial
by reason of prejudicial publicity. In some cases the time lag
between the publicity and the trial was considered important.
15People v. Broady, 195 Misc. 349, 350, 90 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (Sup. Ct.
1949); People v. Sandgen, 190 Misc. 810, 813-14, 75 N.Y.S.2d 753, 757 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
16 Van Riper v. United States, 13 F2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied,
273 U.S. 702 (1926); People v. Malmenato, 4 Ill. 2d 52, 150 N.E.2d 806,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958).
17United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1951); People
v. Lubin, 190 App. Div. 339, 179 N.Y. Supp. 691 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 229
N.Y. 601, 129 N.E. 924 (1920).
18 Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1952); United
States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 866 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952).
19 State v. Lilja, 155 Minn. 251, 193 N.W. 178 (1923); see Langer v.
United States, 76 F.2d 817, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1935).20 The trial judge's discretion extends to all motions where the granting
of such motions would presuppose a finding of partiality. United States v.
Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1956) (motion
for change of venue); Finnegan v. United States, 204 F2d 105 (8th Cir.),
cert. dended, 346 U.S. 821 (1953) (motion for continuance); United States
v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1945) (motion for mistrial);
Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 (1958) (challenge for
cause).
21343 U.S. 181 (1952).22 d. at 195. (Emphasis added.)
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If a significant period of time had intervened between the
publicity and the trial its prejudicial nature was deemed to have lost
its vitality, and the conviction would be upheld.23  A new
trial would, at times, not be granted unless it was likely that
a defendant would have been acquitted but for the preju-
dicial publicity. 2' Sometimes, the office of the person who
had revealed the information was significant. Thus, if the
source was other than an agent of the prosecution, reversal was
unlikely.2 5  In addition, the action of a defense counsel was im-
portant. If he failed to ascertain on the voir dire, whether or
not the jurors had read the publicity, the result of the lower court
would usually not be changed. 26 Finally, when a defense counsel
had failed to exercise all of his peremptory challenges,27 or failed
to move for a change of venue or continuance, 28 a court would
generally infer that prejudice did not exist during the trial.
The majority of the cases had thus adopted the position that
the decision of the trial judge was almost conclusive on the issue
of partiality. Although they stated that it would be a denial of a
fair trial if an accused showed actual prejudice, there was little
indication of how this was to be established. Since partiality
is a state of mind,29 an accused could not show prejudice as an
objective reality. Thus, the demand that it be proven in fact
was a means to uphold the result of the lower court. Indicative
of this viewpoint is the fact that the Supreme Court prior to
Irvin v. Dowd30 had not reversed a single conviction on the
ground that a defendant had been denied an impartial trial by
reason of prejudicial publicity.31
However, a few decisions indicated that a juror's statement
of his ability to set aside a preconceived opinion should be
rejected if it was psychologically untenable. These decisions
proceeded on the theory that the publicity might be such as to
prejudice anyone who read it, notwithstanding his good faith
23 United States v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1962) (3 months);
Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 98 (9th Cir. 1953) (11 weeks).
24 State v. Williams, 96 Minn. 351, 105 N.W. 265 (1905). Contra,
Babb v. State, 18 Ariz. 505, 163 Pac. 259 (1917).
25 Griffen v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924); People v.
Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 152, 109 N.E. 127, 135 (1915); see Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
26 Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d 8, 10-11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 884 (1954).2 7 Note, 27 U. CINc. L. Rav. 87 (1958).
28 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir.
1928).
29United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
30366 U.S. 717 (1961).




assertion to the contrary.32  Thus, the court in Briggs v. United
States,33 held that when adverse publicity was read by a juror
during trial, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arose.34 Likewise,
the court in People v. Hyrciuk 35 reversed a conviction of rape
where the jurors read that the defendant had confessed to two
previous murders, and the prosecution described him as a vicious
degenerate. Reasoning that the jurors were incapable of knowing
the effect which adverse publicity might have upon their un-
conscious minds, the court concluded that the nature and extent
of the publicity was sufficient to create the inference of prejudice,
Irvin v. Dowd
In Irvin v. Dowd,36 the defendant was convicted of murder.
The Supreme Court, 'for the first time, reversed a state con-
viction on the basis that the jury had been prejudiced prior to
trial by inflammatory publicity. The pre-trial publicity contained
exhaustive details of the accused's criminal background. A roving
reporter solicited opinions from the community as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and the punishment he should receive.
These were broadcast over local radio stations. Of the 370
people called for jury duty, ninety per cent expressed an opinion
that the defendant was guilty. Of the twelve jurors eventually
selected, eight stated similar opinions, although they all declared
that they could lay aside their opinions and judge the. accused
on the basis of the evidence presented in the courtroom.37
The Supreme Court reasserted that a juror could be impartial
although he had formulated an opinion. However, despite the
sincerity of the jurors' statements that they could judge the
accused impartially, the Court concluded that partiality existed from
the nature and extent of the publicity, which was evidenced by
the voir dire. The Court stated that, "where so many, so many
times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality cair
be given little weight." 38
Thus, the Court rejected the practice of accepting jurori
declarations of impartiality as conclusive, and affirming convictions
as a matter of course, despite the presence of prejudicial publicity.
It indicated, as a few decisions had done previously, that upon
32 Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959); State v. Peirce, 178 Iowa
417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916); State v. Claypool, 135 Wash. 295, 237 Pac.
730 (1925).
83 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955).
34 Id. at 639.
35 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954).
36 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
3
7 Id. at 727.38 Id. at 728.
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the presentation of certain facts a court would conclude that
prejudice existed despite a juror's declaration to the contrary.
However, the question remained whether this decision would be
limited to factual patterns which were similarly extreme, or whether
it would be applied more generally to the situations where
prejudicial material had come to the attention of a juror.
Recent Developments
Some of the decisions following Irvin seemed to limit it to its
extreme factual pattern. Thus, in Beck v. Washington,39 the Court
affirmed a state conviction of Dave Beck despite the fact that the
chairman of a Senate committee released some derogatory state-
ments to the press.40  The Court distinguished Irvin on the
ground that in that case ninety per cent of the prospective jurors
were of the opinion that the defendant was guilty.41
A sharper limitation of Irvin was made in Geagan v. Gavin.42
The court held that the defendant had not been denied a fair
trial in the state court. To support this conclusion, they noted
that the publicity did not arouse feelings of rage and vengeance 43
as it did in Irvin. They observed that here only seventy-two
per cent rather than ninety per cent of the prospective jurors,
and two rather than eight of the jurors selected, admitted pre-
conceived opinions. According to this interpretation, the appellate
review would offer little protection to an accused who was injured
by prejudicial publicity. To establish grounds for reversal he
would have to -prove that the publicity was sufficiently wide-
spread and inflammatory to incite vengeance in the community,
that this feeling was reflected in the overwhelming majority of the
persons interviewed on the voir dire and the jurors eventually
selected.
On the other hand, there is marked opinion writing indicating
that the Irvin decision will be applied more freely to situations
where there is less extensive prejudicial publicity. In United
States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,44 the defendant was convicted
of murder. Prior to trial, publicity engendered by the district
attorney degrading the defense of insanity was read by some of
the eventual jurors. In granting a writ of habeas corpus, the court
39369 U.S. 541 (1962).4 01d. at 542-45.
41Id. at 557. Many cases relied on this decision to affirm convictions,
despite the fact that there was extensive publicity. See, e.g., Dranow v.
United States, 307 F.2d 545, 564 (8th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Decker,'
304 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1962).
42 292 F2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1963).
43 Id. at 247.
44313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
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indicated that merely obtaining assurances of impartiality from the
jurors is insufficient. The final test is whether the federal judiciary
"is satisfied that the jurors were in fact capable of, and did lay
aside their preconceived judgment." 45 After reviewing the char-
acter and extent of the publicity, the court concluded that it was
impossible for the jurors to lay aside their preconceived opinions.
Thus, the majority refused to accept the view, as did the dis-
sent, that the Irvin decision was limited to "truly exceptional
circumstances." 46
Of even greater consequence is the recent Supreme Court case
of Rideau v. Louisiana.47  Here a film interview of the defendant,
confessing to the sheriff, was televised on three separate occasions.
It was estimated that this interview reached a vast majority of
the community in which the trial was to be held, and three
members of the jury admitted seeing it. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. Without any extensive review of the voir
dire,48 the Court concluded that the pre-trial publicity was so
prejudicial that the confession amounted to the trial, and the sub-
sequent court proceedings were "but a hollow formality." 49
In retrospect, although there is some confusion, there appears
to be a movement in the federal courts to afford an accused greater
protection from the danger of "trial by newspaper." There has
been less reliance placed on the juror's declaration of impartiality,
and more significance placed on the prejudicial nature of the
publicity itself. Where the material read by a juror, either prior
to or after empanelment, is sufficiently prejudicial, a court is
likely to find that partiality existed despite a juror's statement
to the contrary. However, because of the initial confusion, the
state courts have, as yet, shown little inclination to follow this
movement, and instead have limited Irvin to its facts.50
45 id. at 371.
46 Id. at 376.
47373 U.S. 723 (1963).
48 "But we do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a par-
ticularized transcript 6f the voir dire examination of the members of the
jury, that due process of law in this case required a trial before a jury
drawn from a community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's
televised 'interview.'" Id. at 727.
4 9 Id. at 726. Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissent, protested that the Irv;
rationale should not be employed except where the circumstances are
"unusually compelling." Id. at 733.
50 See, e.g., People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d 419, 225
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962); State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819, cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1961); State v. Belt, 111 N.W.2d 588 (S.D.
1961).
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The Federal Supervisory Power and the Impartial Trial
Marshall v. United States
When the Supreme Court is presented with a state conviction,
it can only reverse such a conviction when it finds that the
prejudicial publicity has resulted in a denial of a fair trial in
violation of the due process clause. However, when prejudicial
publicity has interfered with a trial in a federal court, the Supreme
Court need not find a violation of due process, but can reverse
such a conviction in the exercise of its general supervisory power
over the lower federal courts.
In Marshall v. United States,51 the defendant had been con-
victed of dispensing drugs without a prescription in violation of
a federal statute. The government attempted to introduce evidence
that the defendant had previously practiced medicine without a
license. The trial judge ruled that this evidence was inadmissible.
Subsequently, some of the jurors read the same material in the
newspapers. On questioning by the trial judge, each stated that
he would not be influenced by the publicity and that he could
decide the case on the evidence presented. The trial judge then
denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction.
The Court first reasoned that since the evidence was suf-
ficiently prejudicial to warrant its exclusion by the trial judge,
its prejudicial effect on the jurors would not be lessened if it
were read in the newspapers. The Court then reversed the
conviction on the basis of its "supervisory power to formulate and
apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the
federal courts." 52 The Marshall decision, in essence, required
reversal of convictions where evidence which had been explicitly
excluded because of its prejudicial nature 53 was read by jurors.
While the decision might have had limited value as precedent,
since it could have been interpreted as only applying to its peculiar
facts, this has not been the case.
51360 U.S. 310 (1959).
52 Id. at 313.
53 It would seem that if evidence were excluded because irrelevant, there
would be no grounds for reversal. Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893
(Alaska), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961); see United States v. Accardo,




The cases decided since Marshall indicate a wide application
of the rule. 54  In United States v. Dellanmura,55 the district court
relying on Marshall, declared a mistrial where some of the jurors
had seen a photograph of the defendant published in a newspaper
bearing the caption "ex-convict." This decision is especially
revealing since the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
prior to Marshall had upheld the denial of such a motion in cases
involving equally prejudicial information."6 Likewise in Coppedge
v. United States,57 the court reversed a conviction where some
of the jurors had read that a witness was "deathly afraid" of
the defendant because he had pistol-whipped his brother. It is
significant 'that these decisions have applied Marshall in cases
where the prosecution did not attempt to introduce the prejudicial
information into evidence.
In addition, there is dicta to the effect that the Marshall de-
cision might require reversal in cases where individuals have
read prejudicial publicity prior to trial, and had then served as
jurors.58  Furthermore, while the decision is not mandatory on
the state courts, at least one state has felt constrained to distinguishit.59
Comparison
It is true that the standards established by the Supreme
Court for assuring criminal justice in the federal courts are not
necessarily limited by constitutional considerations.60 Nonetheless,
the fact remains that a defendant in a federal prosecution is
54 Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961), reversing, 281 F.2d 156(8th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Accardo, supra note 53. For a discussion
of the Janko rationale see Manes, Irvin v. Dowd: Retreat From Reality,
22 LAw IN TRAirsinoN 46, 52-53 (1962).
65 142 N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1959, p. 3, col. 3-4.56 United States v. Weber, 197 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
834 (1952) (newspapers alleged that the defendant had a prior criminal
record and published a scandalous cartoon); United States v. Leviton, 193
F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952) (newspapers
reported that the defendant had offered a bribe to an important witness
for the prosecution); United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 739 (1934) (publicity alleged that one of the
defendants was involved in a scheme to bribe the assistant to the attorney
general).
57 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959).58 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 728-29 (1963) (dissenting opinion);
United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1962).
But cf. United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 915 (1961).
59 Oxenberg v. State, supra note 53.6 0 MacNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
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afforded greater protection from prejudicial publicity by virtue of
the Marshall precedent than his counterpart in a state court
under the standard of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 61  When a defendant is prosecuted in a federal court,
he will only have to prove that the jurors had read material which
would have been excluded as evidence because of its prejudicial
nature. He will not have to show that the jurors were, in fact,
prejudiced by the information. Even if a court does not apply
Marshall because of the impropriety of establishing a general rule
as to the factual pattern at hand, it could still reverse a con-
viction on the ground that a defendant had been denied due
process by reason of the prejudicial publicity.
However, when a federal court reviews a state conviction, it
has no such option, since the federal supervisory power does not
apply to state courts. Thus, a defendant will have to establish
sufficient facts for the court to find that the existing prejudice
denied him a fair trial in violation of the due process clause.
Depending upon the interpretation placed on Irvin, this burden of
proof might be quite severe. Certainly, the publicity would have
to be more intensive, and its influence on the jury more definite,
in order to obtain reversal of a conviction under due process than
under federal supervisory power.
Critique
The Reliability of a Juror's Declaration of Impartiality
To a considerable extent, those courts which refuse to reverse
convictions, even where extensive prejudicial publicity has been
read by a juror, rely on the juror's own declaration of impartiality
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. However, the validity
of such an assumption is quite doubtful.
Initially, impartiality will be maintained only if it is assumed
that all exposure to prejudicial publicity operates on the conscious
mind. For if a juror is unaware of his unconscious prejudice,
then his declaration of impartiality will not be as reliable as it
might appear.62 Psychology has revealed that prejudice may be
61 Manes, supra note 54, at 53.
62 Some decisions have recognized that the prejudicial publicity may have
a substantial effect on the unconscious mind of the juror. In Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961), the Court stated that, "the influence that
lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights
detachment from the mental processes of the average man." Likewise in
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952), the court
stated, "one cannot assume that the average juror is so endowed with a
sense of detachment, so clear in his introspective perception of his own
mental processes, that he may confidently exclude even the unconscious




subtle and unconscious rather than open.63 Even if it be assumed
that all influence of publicity will reach a conscious level, there
is reason to doubt that an individual who has formulated an
opinion can cast it aside and judge independently on the facts.
More likely than not, if the opinton is emotionally formed, the
juror, albeit conscientious, will place the burden on the defendant
to convince him of his innocence and will resolve all doubts
against him.6 In effect, this shifts the burden of proof from
the prosecution to the defendant thus defeating the benefit he
derives from the presumption of innocence.
Finally, reliance on a juror's declaration presumes that all
jurors who recognize their prejudice will reveal it upon questioning.
Since jurors are average men, it is not unreasonable that many
will conceal the truth 65 due to a reluctance to admit before their
fellow jurors that they are prejudiced.6 6 Even if a juror is
honest, the questions propounded by the trial judge are often
suggestive of their own answers. 67  Certainly, a juror who is
told that it is his constitutional duty to set aside any opinion,
may feel constrained to overestimate his ability to cast aside
prejudice.
63 See generally HALL & LiNDzEY, TmoaiEs OF PERSONALITY, 29-110
(1957); HOLLINGSWORTH, JUDGING HUMAN CHARACTER (1932); SYmoANDs,
DIAGNOSING PERSONALITY AND CONDUCT (1931).6 4 People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.F2d 61 (1954).
65"No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be
fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father." Irvin v. Dowd,
supra note 62, at 728.66 1t is because of this reluctance that some courts have demanded that,
where prejudicial publicity has been read by the jurors, they must be inter-
rogated separately to determine the influence of the publicity. United
States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962); Coppedge v. United States,
272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
67 See Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 903 (1963), where the trial judge questioned as follows:
"Q. If you are accepted as a juror, an oath will be administered to
you that you will well and truly try the issues between the Commonwealth
and these defendants, according to the evidence, which means that you should
serve with an open mind and decide the case purely on the evidence as it
will be presented here, uninfluenced by any preconceived notion, ideas or
opinions that you may now have. Do you think that you could take that
oath and adhere to it faithfully? A. I do, your Honor." Id. at 248.
For similar type of questioning see Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343
S.W.2d 422 (1961). In Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill. 140, 33 N.E. 1 (1893),
the court reversed a conviction where it appeared that the juror's declaration
of impartiality was elicited by the court's argumentative and persuasive
examination.
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Policy Considerations
The major policy reason asserted by the courts for limiting
reversals to extreme factual patterns is that any other standard
would make empanelment of a jury difficult.68 However, the
Marshall decision has apparently not created havoc in federal
prosecutions. In addiion, a more liberal application of the Irvin
decision to less severe situations, where there is some evidence
that jurors have been influenced by prejudicial publicity, would
seem to have some advantageous policy results.
One of these might occur where a defendant moves for a
change of venue or continuance on the ground of hostile publicity.
Thus far, the trial courts have been extremely reluctant to grant
such motions.69 But now, if the Irvin rationale is applied broadly,
trial courts may grant such relief more readily, if only out of a
fear of reversal. While a more liberal employment of these
means will not insure an impartial trial, they may be helpful where
the publicity is of a local nature or is likely to subside in a short
time.70
In addition, this policy might make district attorneys reluctant
to release information to the newspapers pending trial.71  A
prosecutor, faced with a possible reversal due to his release of
inflammatory material, might be hesitant to release such information.
Undoubtedly, since the greatest source of prejudicial information
published by the newspapers stems from the police and prosecution,
this threat of reversal will substantially reduce the amount of
inflammatory material actually published.
Conclusion
In recent years, there has been increasing sensitivity, at least
in the Supreme Court, for the need to protect a defendant's right
to an impartial trial. Certainly where the prosecution arises in the
federal courts, the Marshall decision affords a defendant some
measure of protection. Where the prosecution arises in state
courts, it is difficult to ascertain what quantum of evidence must
6 8 United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248, 258 (2d Cir. 1944); Wolfe v.
Nash, 205 F. Supp. 219, 226 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 393 (8th
Cir. 1963).69 Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 746-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 826 (1948); United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (denial of motion for change of venue); United States v. Hoffa,156 F. Supp. 495' (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Sterns, 140 F. Supp.
761, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (denial of motion for continuance).7o For a discussion of the effectiveness of these motions to secure an
impartial trial see Note, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 349, 360-70 (1960).
71 District Attorney Hogan has already made an office rule prohibiting
the release of confessions to the newspapers prior to trial. 131 N.Y.LJ.,
April 22, 1954, p. 4, col. 3-4.
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be presented to the court to warrant a finding of partiality. How-
ever, if the appellate courts are to fulfill honestly the requirement
of a de novo examination on the issue of partiality, then they
cannot wholly rely on a juror's own estimation of his ability to
set aside a preconceived opinion. 72 Rather, equal weight should be
given to the nature and extent of the publicity, and the record
of the voir dire. Of course, where the publicity is of such a
prejudicial nature that it would be psychologically impossible for
jurors to be impartial after exposure to it, reversal should be
granted.
Ultimately, reversal of convictions will not eliminate the
continued publication of inflammatory material. The economic ad-
vantages reaped by newspapers from sensational crime-reporting are
too great for them to abandon such type of publicity.7 3 Many
measures have been suggested to control "trial by newspaper."
Among the most promising are a greater use of the contempt
power,74 a more stringent enforcement of the canon of the
American Bar Association prohibiting lawyers from giving in-
formation to newspapers on pending prosecutions, 75 and a more
useful employment of the right of a defendant to waive a public
trial.76
Until these remedies become effective, a defendant's only
recourse, when he has been denied his right to an impartial trial.
is an appeal for relief to an appellate court. If the recent trend
72 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); United States v. Smith,
306 F.2d 596, 602 (2d Cir. 1962).
73 There is a high correlation between the amount of crime news and
both the amount of advertising and the paper's circulation. Caldwell,
Sensational News in the Modern Metropolitan Newspapers, 23 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 203 (1932); Holmes, Crime and the Press, 20
J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 246, 289 (1929).
74 By citing for contempt any publication tending to interfere with an
impartial decision of a case, the English courts have largely eliminated trial
by newspaper. On the other hand, in the United -States, Supreme Court
decisions have greatly limited any effective employment of the contempt
power over newspapers. SULLIVAN, CONTEMPT BY PUmCATION (3d ed.
1941); Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law,
48 HARv. L. IEv. 885 (1935); Hanson, The Supreme Court on Freedom of
the Press and Contempt by Publication, 27 CoRtNEL L.Q. 165 (1942);
Note, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 147 (1961).
75ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 20 states: "Newspaper
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere
with a fair trial in the Courts.... Generally they are to be condemned. ...
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from
the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is
better to avoid any ex parte statement." For a discussion of this canon see
Symposium, Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16, 40-43
(1955).
76Mueller, Problems Posed By Publicity To Crime And Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1, 23-26 (1961).
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of the Supreme Court is followed, this right will be protected
with some measure of diligence.
X
AIRPLANE NOISE ABATEMENT - COMMUNITY INITIATIVE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
Airplane noise has constantly plagued persons residing on
property situated near airports. Aircraft, when passing over these
neighboring homes emit noise of high intensity.' The results are
a frequent interference with domestic activity and, at times, in-
juries to both person and property.2 Two new developments,
moreover, will increase the discomfort already sustained. The first,
a general increase in air activity, will in all probability be
responsible for increased disturbances.3  Secondly, the jets in-
troduced by, the commercial carriers will emit noise at a greater
intensity than propeller driven aircraft and their flatter glide
angles will spread the noise over a longer radius.4
In the past, these property owners have sought relief through
actions for trespass and nuisance. When the defendant was a
governmental body, relief was sought for an uncompensated taking
of land.5 The individual lawsuits, however, did not solve the noise
problem. Rather, they were somewhat analogous to a doctor
treating a patient's symptom while neglecting his disease. In the
face of this probable increase in airplane noise, the question
arises as to whether the community, rather than the individual
landowners, should take the initiative in dealing with the problem.
At least one community has realized the need for group action,
and has attempted to control the problem through legislation.
This attempt, however, was found to have exceeded constitutional
limitations. 6  The purpose of this note, therefore, will be to
'America, Jan. 21, 1961, p. 546.
2See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Highland
Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. C1. 1958). As to the
effect of continuous exposure to loud noise see Time, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 29.
3 In 1950, the Federal Aviation Agency air towers reported that air
carriers alone were responsible for approximately four million operations.
By 1960, this figure was increased to approximately seven million. Aviation
Week and Space Technology, May 1, 1961, p. 95.
4 Weibel, Poblems of Federals in the Air Age-Part I, 24 J. Am
L. & Com. 127, 128 (1957). The glide angle is defined as the number of
feet of horizontal movement necessary for each foot of ascent or descent.
Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma,
56 MicH. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (1958).
5 Note, 74 HARV. L. Rzv. 1581, 1582-84 (1961).6 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
[ VOL. 38
